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Abstract—Named Data Networking (NDN) is a content-centric
networking, where the publisher of the packet signs and encapsu-
lates the data packet with a name-content-signature encryption
to verify the authenticity and integrity of itself. This scheme
can solve many of the security issues inherently compared to IP
networking. NDN also support mobility since it hides the point-to-
point connection details. However, an extreme attack takes place
when an NDN consumer newly connects to a network. A Man-
in-the-middle (MITM) malicious node can block the consumer
and keep intercepting the interest packets sent out so as to
fake the corresponding data packets signed with its own private
key. Without knowledge and trust to the network, the NDN
consumer can by no means perceive the attack and thus exposed
to severe security and privacy hazard. In this paper, the Name-
Signature Lookup System (NSLS) and corresponding Name-
Signature Lookup Protocol (NSLP) is introduced to verify packets
with their registered genuine publisher even in an untrusted
network with the help of embedded keys inside Network Interface
Controller (NIC), by which attacks like MITM is eliminated. A
theoretical analysis of comparing NSLS with existing security
model is provided. Digest algorithm SHA-256 and signature
algorithm RSA are used in the NSLP model without specific
preference.
Index Terms—Named Data Networking, Man-in-the-middle
attack, Network Interface Controller
I. INTRODUCTION
Initially, Named Data Networking is designed with security
features which are sophisticated to be implemented in IP
networking with massive overheads [2]. However, to verify
encapsulated data packets, the consumer has to iteratively
look through key locator as declared until an installed trust
anchor has been reached. Mostly this verification mechanism
works efficiently. However, there are chances that packets for
installing a trust anchor are compromised [3].
To eliminate the aforementioned threats, in this paper,
we introduce Name-Signature Lookup System (NSLS), a
semantically-centralized registry with hardware-level authen-
tication. Tuples naming zone - public key are stored in the
registry servers. As discussed in Section IV, the NSLS enables
the NDN of enhanced security features using standard NDN
scheme.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we explain
why the safety situation cannot be eliminated by the existing
NDN security scheme. Second, we design the NSLS with
a protocol to resolve related attacks. Third, we discuss the
compatibility of NSLS to NDN. This work on NSLS can draw
more inspiration on the combination of hardware and software
for cyber-security.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Named Data Networking
Named Data Networking (NDN) [1], is a content-centric
networking where consumer sends out interest packet with a
specific name and pulls back the data packet from somewhere
in the network with the corresponding name.
Instead of point-to-point communication, NDN avoids es-
tablishing channels but to request for a packet with a certain
name to the whole network. Any node possessing the packet
with matching name respond directly to the consumer. Thus,
critical security threats shift from securing the channel to
verify the data packet itself by design.
B. Man-in-the-middle Attack (MITM)
Man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM) refers to the safety sit-
uation, where a malicious node intercepts a data link between
two nodes, generally between an end-user and a router or
switch connected to the rest of the network [6]. MITM can
intercept every packet that passes through the link and even
make a fake one based on meta-information. For an attack on
NDN network, MITM can encapsulate a data packet with the
same name but different content, and sign the packet with its
own key. By intercepting and spoofing the packet containing
the genuine public key, the user can never perceive it is under
cyber attack and be exposed to MITM entirely.
C. Network Interface Controller (NIC)
Network Interface Controller (NIC) is a hardware compo-
nent of a networked node which provides low-level connec-
tions to any other network. NIC stores crucial details such
as MAC address and protocol stacks for data packet exchange
with the network. Moreover, these details are transparent to the
application level, which in other word means it is difficult to
modify any value embedded in NIC through operating systems
directly.
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D. Digest algorithm and Signature algorithm
A digest algorithm or a hash algorithm is used to produce a
message digest which can indicate the integrity of the message.
A Signature algorithm typically uses the private key out of a
pair of asymmetric keys to sign the hash value of the message,
and anyone having the corresponding public key can verify the
signature enclosed in the packet.
In terms of NDN, a packet digest comes out by applying a
proper hash algorithm to the combination of the name and the
content. Then a proper signature algorithm is applied to the
hash value to get a signature which eventually is enclosed in
the packet.
In the context, digest algorithm SHA-256 and signature
algorithm RSA [7] are selected for instance without explicit
preference. Other hash algorithms, such as MD5, HMAC, SM3
[13] and signature algorithms such as 3DES, AES, SM2 [12]
are also valid. Specific digest algorithm or signature algorithm
can be substituted for designated scenarios.
E. Existing Security Scheme for NDN
The data packet is requested to enclose the signature from
the producer. The signature is generated by implementing a
signature algorithm on the digest of the name and the content
[4]. This inherent security scheme can ensure the authenticity
and integrity of the data packet by verifying the signature
derived from the key locator. The key locator always points to
a superior publisher until it reaches to the root, which is the
trust anchor.
In summery, although existing NDN security schemes use
signature and key locator to ensure the authenticity and
integrity of a single data packet, there is still the possibility of
a MITM blocking the communication from the very beginning.
Key locator cannot ensure that the trust anchor is not fabricated
since every packet to the so-called reliable source can be
intercepted under this extreme circumstance.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In terms of the security, which is authenticity and integrity,
of every NDN data packet following a standardized encryption
procedure, NDN has realized a higher level of security than IP
networking by design. However, as we aforementioned, with
the inherence of mobility, an NDN consumer node can join
a network without any pre-knowledge, leading to a situation
that a MITM can spoof the consumer by not only fabricating
the data packet with the same name as the interest packet
sent outbound but also providing a legitimate signature. The
consumer is not able to perceive the sensitive situation since
MITM can intercept any packet going through and thus any
kind of hierarchical trust mechanism takes no effect without
any pre-knowledge.
Theoretically, MITM cannot be detected directly as stated.
Thus, our work mainly focuses on how to eliminate the critical
threats caused by an intercepting node, which is specifically
spoofing. As a trade-off, privacy especially interest leakage
related to eavesdropping or intercepting should be covered
by a higher level cryptography algorithm to prevent sensitive
content leakage. The Name-Signature Lookup System (NSLS)
is carried out to ensure the authenticity and integrity of packets
but not secure delivery.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
To solve the defect of the existing NDN security scheme,
we propose a solution with an additional layer of verification,
including the support of the NIC hardware and a semantically-
centralized server running the Name-Signature Lookup Sys-
tem. The mechanism of conducting the NSLS verification upon
the ordinary NDN architecture would be named as Name-
Signature Lookup Protocol (NSLP).
The prerequisite of NSLP is:
• The NSLS server generates a pair of RSA asymmetric
keys and makes it accessible to all the manufacturers of
NIC.
• To support a specific NSLS server of NSLP, the manu-
facturers should embed the up-to-date accessible public
key of the NSLS server into the NIC.
• The NDN consumers should equip their network-
accessing node with a NIC supporting NSLP.
The integrity of the hardware NIC is crucial to the imple-
mentation of NSLP. Thus, the most ideal proposition would
be, the profile of NIC is immutable from the perspective
of the operating system layer or above, which is similar to
Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) on motherboard [10]. The
Hardware-level restriction does enhance the reliability of the
security model involving asymmetric verification.
Fig. 1. Illustration of NDN nodes with NSLP
Correspondingly, there would be a cluster of servers running
NSLS on the other end. Internally the cluster can form a
hierarchy structure similar to DNS [8], [9], while externally
it is regarded as an accredited registry where NSLP-enabled
publishers can register their NDN-identified name zone with
their public key. In other words, a specific packet name
only matches at most one unique public key declared by the
publisher under NSLP. By this approach, it can also unify
the universal NDN namespace. When a consumer attempts
to pull a packet (with name pName for instance), the node
sends out two interest packets in parallel. One is the normal
2
NDN interest packet for pName, the other is semantically an
NSLP packet. The name of the NSLP packets comprises a
prefix pointing to the NSLS server and the name of the interest
packet pName. Specifically, the name of the NSLP packet is
NSLS/pName in the context (the name of the NSLS server is
assumed as NSLS). The procedure is carried out within the
scope of NIC and the actual string of the prefix is directly
extracted from NIC. The worker thread shown in Procedure
2 is invoked by Algorithm 1. Both of the interest packets go
through the standardized NDN procedure, which is, matching
the name of the data packet no matter from Content Store
of an NDN router or from an NSLS server. A Content Store
or a built-in cache on NIC for NSLP can be introduced for
better performance and this is discussed in the later section.
The threads joins after receiving both of the data packets.
Fig. 2. Overview of how NSLP works in an NDN network
The verification procedure starts from the NSLP data packet
first. The signature of the NSLS server can be verified at
ease, since the corresponding public key of the specific NSLS
server has been embedded into NIC. Any fake signature can be
detected at this stage thus preventing further security hazards.
If the immutable public key can decrypt and verify the NSLP
packet, then the public key on consignment can be retrieved
from the content of the NSLP data packet. Unlike normal NDN
data packets using key locator to verify the data packet, NSLP
uses the public key extracted from the corresponding NSLP
data packet to proceed verification. The public key then can be
regarded to be authenticated from a universal-trusted registry.
Ultimately, any data packet cannot be verified by the genuine
public key is discarded. On the contrary, content retrieved from
an NSLP-verified packet remains authenticity and integrity
even from an untrusted NDN network.
The core idea of the NSLP protocol is to make sure
every node enabling NSLP has existing knowledge before
joining any network. Public keys embedded in the NIC can
be regarded as hardware-level trust anchors. Implementation of
NSLP and NSLS does not eliminate Man-in-the-middle itself
but reduces the impact of being under MITM attacks.
Besides, A NSLP interest and data packet can be regarded
as a wrapper based on typical NDN interest and data packet.
The only semantic difference is that, the name of NSLP packet
explicitly points to an NSLS server. In other words, NSLP
has a higher level of abstraction over NDN, which indicates
excellent compatibility and scalability.
Algorithm 1 Name-Signature Lookup Protocol
Input:
NSLS ← NSLS server name referred in NIC
NSLS.pub ← corresponding public key of NSLS server
pName ← contentname to fetch from NDN network
Output:
content of data packet pName from NDN
1: send i pkg for pName
2: threads fork (invoking Procedure 2)
3: receive d pkg pName
4: threads join
5: if RSAVerify(NSLS/pName, NSLS.pub) then
6: pName.pub ← content of NSLS/pName
7: if RSAVerify(pName, pName.pub) then
8: return
9: else
10: Abort
11: end if
12: else
13: Abort
14: end if
Procedure 2 Name-Signature Lookup Protocol worker thread
1: if lookupNICcache(NSLS/pName) then
2: return d pkg NSLS/pName
3: threads join
4: else
5: send i pkg NSLS/pName
6: receive d pkg NSLS/pName
7: threads join
8: end if
V. ANALYSIS
A. Robustness
The robustness of normal NDN scheme relies on the trans-
mission of the packet containing a trust anchor. This security
scheme can be compromised when encountering such extreme
MITM attacks in the context.
Fig. 3. Analysis when encountering 50% of extreme MITM attacks
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On the contrary, the robustness of NSLP depends on the
signature algorithm applied. The NSLP remains effective as
long as the signature algorithm applied is proved to be robust
at the current stage. The implementation of NSLP realizes
systematic robustness by design. However, there are Byzantine
faults which might lead to immediate cracking to a specific
signature algorithm.
Figure 3 shows the expected performance when NSLP and
NDN encounter hybrid MITM attacks. Half amount of attacks
comprise fabricated signature and no existing trust anchor can
verify that. The attacks aforementioned simulate the situation
when NDN nodes attempt to install an unknown trust anchor.
In contrast, NSLP can theoretically detect fabricated signature
attacks with the help of hardware-level pre-installed trust
anchor, which is the asymmetric public key in the context.
Fig. 4. Name-Signature Lookup Protocol (NSLP) procedure
B. Overheads
Despite confounding factors such as the scattered distribu-
tion of data packets, utilization of Content Store and link-
layer latency, the overheads can be analyzed by the number
of interest packets sent out. The NSLP constantly require two
interest packets for a genuine named data packet. However,
normal NDN trust management involves a hierarchical key
locator. The exact count of interest packets is proportional to
the count of naming domain. Take cs/coursework/user1 for
instance. Regarding cs as the trust anchor, section coursework
and publisher user1 respectively maintain their own key pairs.
In other words, the length of the specific key locator is 3.
Fig. 5. Theoretical analysis on overheads
It is explicit to conclude from figure 5 that, NSLP has an
advantage on overheads over NDN. It is also non-trivial to
optimize the naming scheme to avoid unnecessary overheads
caused by sophisticated hierarchical trust management scheme.
VI. FURTHER DISCUSSION
A. Scalability
The NSLP can be regarded as an enhanced feature for NDN
security. Supporting and running the protocol does not affect
the normal NDN procedure. NSLP-supported NIC can be an
advanced option for security-sensitive use when building up a
PC or server. In the other end, a single centralized server can
be scaled up to a cluster of servers. Hierarchical distributed
servers such as DNS can be deployed across a nation or the
world depending on service type.
B. Compatibility
No alteration of a normal NDN packet is done in order to
implement NSLP. In other words, NSLP is entirely transparent
to NDN. There are merely NDN interest packets and NDN data
packets in the NDN network while NSLS is in service. The
existence of NSLP do not affect the normal NDN procedure.
Correspondingly, NSLP stack identifies every NSLP process
according to packet names.
C. Extension
1) Timeout: A timeout scheme is necessary to be set up
since a pair of interest packets are sent out in parallel. There
would be no response if an NSLS packet failed to find a
matching NSLS entry. Thus, it is confusing to determine
whether the NSLS packet is still on its way or already
exhausted to find the corresponding record. The actual value of
timeout is rather flexible to set in terms of different scenarios.
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2) Working modes: A set of parameters can be adjustable
in order to fit the diverse need of NSLP.
• parallel/NSLS-first: parallel mode gain higher efficiency
while NSLS-first mode does not even make an interest
packet out if the name to pull is not registered in NSLS.
• top-sec/up-to-date/cacheable: top-sec mode doesn’t allow
any NSLS data packet pulled from a CS in routers and
even remove local cache in NIC to achieve maximum
security. Reversely any NSLS data packet tagged as
top-sec cannot be cached by the router [11]. Cacheable
mode enabling cache in routers is comparatively the most
efficient but least secure mode against top-sec mode. Up-
to-date mode ignores local cache in NIC in order to
always get the freshest NSLS data packet.
D. Limitation
The proposed solution can take effect only with the ex-
istence of an NSLS server (cluster) and NSLP-enabled NIC
cards. For the semantically-centralized server, an organization
must manage to maintain the server. Moreover, the deputy
organization have to keep in tight contact with the NIC
manufacturer so as to support the protocol with its public
key. Otherwise, it would be sophisticated and potentially risky
to update a NIC card to support a specific NSLS server.
Thus, to realize the maximum utilization of the NSLS, the
ideal situation would be the NIC manufacturer running and
maintaining the NSLS servers.
E. Potential Hazards
The only existing security threat would be the leakage of the
private key of the NSLS server. The private key in working
status should be kept at the top level of defence. Thus, we
propose always having a backup pair of private key when using
asymmetric signature algorithm. The corresponding backup
public key should be embedded in the NIC as well while
the backup private key should be kept separately from the
primary private key but still in top standard defence. Besides,
it is true that there is still the possibility of cracking the
asymmetric signature algorithms such as RSA. However, more
robust signature algorithms with compatible interfaces can be
substituted if necessary. It is reasonable to release new NIC
with an up-to-date signature algorithm for an epoch.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we described the design of NSLP and NSLS
which provide an extra layer of verification in cooperation with
network hardware. Details of implementation are needed for
further research. So far it has been a conceptual model which
theoretically resolved remaining attacks related to authenticity
and integrity.
The focus of this paper has always been on an extreme case,
which is, what if a malicious node can intercept and fabricate
NDN packets and a consumer node just joined and forwarded
every interest packet through it? The situation is not pervasive
but also non-trivial. The solution to this case highly relies
on the robustness of RSA or any other asymmetric signature
algorithm. NSLP remains robust and effective as long as the
signature algorithm applied remains uncompromised.
In summary, with a semantically-centralized NSLS server
and NIC hardware support, NSLP ultimately eliminates impact
of any potential spoofing attacks such as MITM. Moreover, it
follows the standardized NDN procedure, which indicates high
compatibility and resiliency to existing NDN architecture. The
NSLP works transparently to the user as long as an NSLP-
supported NIC is equipped.
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